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The Referendum Debate, the Democratic Deficit and the 
Governance of Scotland 
Alan Page 
A casual observer of the referendum debate might have been forgiven for thinking that what 
mattered most was whether Scotland would be financially better or worse off as an 
independent country, with one side claiming that Scotland could be as much as £5 billion a 
year better off within 15 years of independence,1 and the other that it would benefit from a 
“UK Dividend” of £1,400 per person per year were it to remain part of the United Kingdom.2 
The casual observer might well have been right, but as was observed on the setting up of the 
Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1969, in response to the upsurge in support for 
nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales, “more is involved in the constitutional development 
of Scotland, or indeed of any country, than the most convenient economic and fiscal 
arrangements. More is at stake than an efficient reorganisation of local government.”3 There 
is also the question of what today is commonly referred to as “governance”, an effective 
system of which, within a constitutional democracy, requires a balance between “the ability 
to conduct the business of government effectively and the limitation of the executive power 
of government in order to avoid abuse of power or loss of democratic consent.”4 
Had Scotland voted Yes in September 2014, the SNP government's intention was that the 
Scottish Parliament elected in May 2016 should be required to establish a constitutional 
1 Scottish Government, Outlook for Scotland’s Public Finances and the Opportunities of Independence (May 
2014) p 48. 
2 HM Treasury, Scotland Analysis: Fiscal policy and sustainability (Cm 8854 2014). 
3 A W Bradley, “Some Constitutional Aspects of Scottish Development” in J N Wolfe (ed), Government and 
Nationalism in Scotland: An Enquiry by Members of the University of Edinburgh (EUP 1969) 41.  
4 Sir John Elvidge, “Governance and the Institutional Framework” in Andrew Goudie (ed), Scotland’s Future: 
The Economics of Constitutional Change (DUP 2013) 268; other desired characteristics of an effective system 
of governance, identified by Elvidge, include clarity of accountability and of responsibilities, and a balance 
between representativeness of society and the availability of high levels of expertise in the matters with which 
government is concerned. 
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convention to prepare a permanent written constitution for Scotland.5 A written constitution 
would distinguish an independent Scotland from the United Kingdom which, it was said, was 
the only country in the European Union, and the only country in the Commonwealth, which 
did not have a written constitution or Constitution Act.6 In the meantime, the Scottish 
Independence Act 2015, an Act of the Scottish Parliament, would have put in place an 
“interim constitution”, which together with a “refreshed” Scotland Act would provide the 
basis for the governance of Scotland until such time as a written constitution was agreed “by 
or on behalf of the people of Scotland”.7  
Scotland’s written constitution featured to a certain extent in the referendum debate, not least 
as an opportunity to remind voters of those aspects of the governance of the United Kingdom 
to which the SNP government was opposed – the presence of nuclear weapons on the Clyde, 
cuts in welfare spending, and the “illegal” invasion of Iraq amongst others.8 The governance 
of Scotland under the devolution settlement, or as it would have been between independence 
and the written constitution, by contrast, featured hardly at all. As one commentator remarked 
of the former, “the campaign was conducted without any close examination of the record of 
the devolved parliament or of the quality of its elected representatives; it was almost as if 
Scotland had no devolved powers or that it had never used them.”9 This chapter examines the 
governance of Scotland as it would have been, had the Scottish government’s proposals been 
implemented, in the interval between independence and the written constitution coming into 
force. Before doing so it recalls the main features of the governance of Scotland under the 
devolution settlement. It concludes by outlining some of the respects in which the governance 
                                                          
5 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland (November 2013) p 332; 
Scottish Government, The Scottish Independence Bill: A Consultation on an Interim Constitution for Scotland 
(June 2014) s 33. 
6Alex Salmond, “The People’s Constitution”, speech in Campbeltown, 28 August 2013. 
7 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) s 4(1).  
8 Alex Salmond, speech to the Foreign Press Association, 16 January 2013.  
9 Kenneth Roy, The Invisible Spirit: A Life of Post-War Scotland 1945-75 (2nd edn, Birlinn 2014) 518.   
of Scotland may change, and the challenges it faces, following enactment of the Scotland Bill 
currently before the UK Parliament at Westminster. 
The devolution settlement 
The devolution settlement is based on the Scotland Act 1998, which established the Scottish 
Parliament and Scottish Government and defined the limits to their powers. The Scottish 
Parliament is elected by a form of proportional representation, the additional member or 
mixed member system, rather than the first past the post system used at Westminster, which 
was meant to prevent any single party gaining an outright majority, but which in the event did 
not prevent the SNP winning an overall majority in 2011, making inevitable a referendum on 
Scotland’s constitutional future. The Scottish Government, which was originally called the 
Scottish Executive in a vain attempt to distinguish it from the UK Government, is drawn from 
the Scottish Parliament, on the Westminster model, and accountable to it for the devolved 
governance of Scotland.10  
Limits  
The Scottish Parliament has the power to make laws, “to be known as Acts of the Scottish 
Parliament”.11 In contrast to the ‘sovereign’ UK Parliament, however, its legislative 
competence is limited. Among the restrictions on its legislative competence, it has no power 
to legislate in relation to the matters reserved to Westminster by Schedule 5 to the Scotland 
Act.12 As well as a number of general reservations, which include the constitution, defence 
and foreign affairs, these include a long list of specific reservations, ranging from fiscal, 
economic and monetary policy, with exceptions for devolved taxes and local taxes to fund 
                                                          
10 The re-branding of the Scottish Executive as the Scottish Government was given formal legal effect by the 
Scotland Act 2012, s 12. 
11 Scotland Act 1998 (SA 1998) s 28(1). 
12 SA 1998 s 29(2)(b). 
Commented [t1]: Strange comment.  Was it vain to 
attempt it?  Or are you suggesting the attempt was 
unsuccessful? 
Commented [AP2R1]: Standard English usage: see any 
dictionary definition of ‘vain’, but if it is thought to be 
unclear happy to replace with ‘unsuccessful’  
local authority expenditure, to the regulation of activities in Antarctica.13 It also has no power 
to modify the enactments listed in Schedule 4 to the Act,14 which include the Human Rights 
Act 1998, the provisions of the European Communities Act 1972 which give effect to EU law 
in the UK, and the Scotland Act itself. It thus has no power to amend its constituent 
instrument. Nor does it have the power to legislate incompatibly with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or EU law.15 Should the Scottish Parliament legislate 
contrary to the ECHR, the courts have the power to strike down its legislation as ultra vires or 
unconstitutional. They are not confined to making a declaration of incompatibility as they 
would be in the case of an Act of the UK Parliament,16 which would then leave the 
Parliament to decide whether the offending legislation should be amended to bring it into line 
with the Convention.17      
The Scottish Government is subject to essentially the same restrictions as the Scottish 
Parliament, save that it may take executive action, including make subordinate legislation, in 
relation to reserved matters where authorised to do so by or under a UK Act of Parliament.  
Organisational v constitutional autonomy  
Under the devolution settlement, Scotland enjoys a high degree of autonomy over its 
organisational arrangements. With the principal exception of criminal prosecutions, which are 
a matter for the Lord Advocate,18 the arrangements for the exercise of devolved functions are 
a matter for the Scottish Government and, to the extent that its approval is required, the 
Scottish Parliament. Scotland’s constitutional arrangements - the principal institutions of 
                                                          
13 SA 1998 Sch 5 Pt III ss A1 and L7.  
14 SA 1998 s 29(2(c). 
15 SA 1998 s 29(2(d). 
16 Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) s 4. 
17 Under the Scotland Act 1998, s 102(1), the courts have the power to make an order removing or limiting the 
retrospective effect of a finding of invalidity, or suspending its effect in order to a llow the defect to be corrected, 
but the making of such an order is at the court’s discretion; see e.g. Salvesen v Riddell [2013] UKSC 22. 
18 SA 1998 s 29(2)(e). 
devolved governance and the relationships between them - by contrast, are beyond the reach 
of the Scottish Parliament. If they are to be altered it can only be by the Westminster 
Parliament, with the agreement of the Scottish Parliament under the Sewel convention. The 
Scottish Parliament itself has no power to alter them.19  
The Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament have made extensive use of their powers 
over the organisation of devolved governance. At the level of central government, the 
departmental structure inherited from the former Scottish Office has been abolished as part of 
the adoption of an ‘outcomes based’ approach to government. Public bodies have undergone 
two waves of rationalisation, much of it involving “the amalgamation of bodies without 
substantive change in functions.”20 The judicial system has been extensively revised.21 And in 
a move which led to widespread criticism of what were seen the centralising tendencies of the 
majority SNP government elected in 2011, Scotland’s eight regional police forces were 
merged to form a single national police force.22  
Local government 
Scotland’s constitutional arrangements as prescribed by the Scotland Act do not include 
Scotland’s 32 local authorities. The Scottish Constitutional Convention, on whose 
recommendations the Scotland Act was based, wanted the devolution legislation to include a 
provision committing the Scottish Parliament to securing and maintaining a “strong and 
effective system of local government”, and to embody the principle of subsidiarity “so as to 
                                                          
19 It was a complaint under the Scotland Act as originally enacted that the Scottish Parliament was unable to 
appoint a temporary additional deputy presiding officer without asking Westminster to amend the Act. The 
Scotland Act 2012, s 4 empowered the Parliament appoint additional deputies, on the recommendation of the 
Calman Commission. 
20 Elvidge (n 4) 280. 
21 Judiciary and Courts (Scotland) Act 2008; Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014. 
22 Police and Fire Reform Scotland Act 2012; the criticism was given added force by the rationalisation of 
Scotland’s 32 colleges of further education to form 17 ‘college regions’ under the Post -16 Education (Scotland) 
Act 2013. 
guarantee the important role of local government in service delivery.”23 In the White Paper 
that preceded the Act, however, the Labour Government confined itself to saying that it did 
not expect the Scottish Parliament and its Executive “to accumulate a range of new functions 
at the centre which would be more appropriately and efficiently delivered by other bodies 
within Scotland”, adding that it believed that “the principle that decisions should be made as 
close as possible to the citizen holds good within Scotland as it does within the United 
Kingdom”.24  
Notwithstanding the lack of direct constitutional recognition, the status of local government 
has been recognised in various ways since devolution. The Accounts Commission, for 
example, has retained control of local authority audit - but not of health authority audit - in 
recognition of “the autonomy of local government as a separate democratically accountable 
tier of government”;25 while the general restructuring power taken in the Public Services 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 may not be used to remove functions from local authorities or to 
make any structural change in relation to local government.26 The removal of school 
education from local authority control, for example, which has sometimes been suggested as 
a means of reducing the dependence of local authorities on central government funding,27 
would thus require primary legislation.  
Accountability 
The Scottish Constitutional Convention expected the Parliament to provide through its 
practices and procedures “a form of government in whose accountability, accessibility, 
                                                          
23 Scottish Constitutional Convention, Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right (1995) p 16. 
24 Scottish Office, Scotland’s Parliament (Cm 3658, 1997) para 6.4. 
25 Scottish Office, Principles of the Scottish Parliament’s Financial Procedures: Final Report of the Financial 
Issues Advisory Group (1999) para 6.41.  
26 Public Services Reform (Scotland) Act 2010, s 14(5).  
27 Elvidge (n 4) 283. 
openness and responsiveness the people of Scotland will have confidence and pride.”28  
Accountability was not conceived solely in terms of parliamentary (or judicial) 
accountability, but the Parliament was expected to play a prominent part in holding the 
Scottish Executive to account. The Consultative Steering Group (CSG), which was set up by 
the Secretary of State for Scotland to recommend the procedures the Parliament might be 
invited to adopt, was thus “careful” to develop procedures designed to ensure that the 
Scottish Executive was “fully accountable” to the Scottish Parliament for its actions.29 
Recommending the CSG principles to the Parliament, Henry McLeish, the former chair of the 
CSG, claimed that the Scottish Executive would be “much more accountable to the 
Parliament in Scotland than the Government is to the Parliament in Westminster.”30  
At the heart of the Parliament’s procedures are its committees, which combine the roles of 
select and public bill (formerly standing committees) at Westminster, the idea being to enable 
MSPs to develop expertise in particular areas and to bring an informed view to the 
consideration of legislation and the scrutiny of government. Almost from the outset, however, 
the Parliament’s committees struggled to match the expectations held of them. In the first two 
sessions (1999-2007), lack of time together with the breadth of their remits made it difficult 
for some committees to cover the ground, with the demands of legislative scrutiny in 
particular reducing the scope for some committees to undertake their own inquiries.31 The 
slackening of the legislative pace in the third session (2007-2011), however, when a minority 
SNP government was in power, was not accompanied by any noticeable increase in scrutiny, 
the political focus by then having shifted to the chamber, and Labour and Liberal Democrat 
                                                          
28 Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right (n 22) p 24. 
29 Scottish Office, Shaping Scotland’s Parliament: Report of the Consultative Steering Group on the Scottish 
Parliament (December 1998) section 2, para 25 and section 3.4, para 1; accountability was one of the key 
principles on which the CSG’s proposals were based: “the Scottish Executive should be accountable to the 
Scottish Parliament, and the Parliament and the Executive should be accountable to the people of Scotland”.  
30 Scottish Parliament Official Report 9 June 1999, col 367. 
31 In its Session 2 legacy paper, the Conveners Group singled out the difficulty in achieving a balance between 
legislative scrutiny and other essential scrutiny work as one of the most significant issues faced by committees 
in that session: Conveners Group Legacy Paper, 2nd Session (February 2007) para 4.  
MSPs being at the same time reluctant to revisit their own record by way of post-legislative 
scrutiny. The sometimes rapid turnover of members also meant that committees did not build 
up the expertise anticipated.   
 Faced with an avalanche of criticism at the end of its third session,32 the Parliament 
embarked on what was billed as a “thorough MoT” of its performance.33 Question time was 
adjusted to increase the opportunity for more topical questions, and committee conveners 
were said by the Parliament’s Presiding Officer to have “enthusiastically endorsed a reform 
agenda that should enable parliamentary committees to increase their agility, responsiveness 
and focus”.34 After three years, however, and with the referendum imminent, the Conveners 
Group’s “programme for change” seemed to be more about securing favourable publicity for 
the work of committees than improving their effectiveness in holding government to account.  
The courts, as we have seen, occupy a powerful position in the devolved constitution. Should 
the Parliament exceed the limits on its competence, they have the power to strike down its 
legislation as unconstitutional, a power they do not possess in relation to UK Acts of 
Parliament, being confined to making a declaration of incompatibility with Convention rights 
or, in the case of incompatibly with EU law, to denying effect to the offending legislation. 
Without this power the only check on the Parliament’s potential for “arbitrary and oppressive 
action”35 would have been political – in the form of UK ministerial intervention – which 
would have been a recipe for intergovernmental conflict as well as affording individuals no 
                                                          
32 See e.g. “Lord Foulkes attacks ‘pathetic’ Scottish Parliament”, Telegraph 21 September 2010; Jackson 
Carlaw, “It’s time to realise the potential of the Scottish Parliament” (October 2010); Jack McConnell, “Why 
the ‘pedestrian’ Scottish Parliament needs overhauling” Telegraph 24 November 2010; “Holyrood’s ‘three wise 
men’ back parliament overhaul” Telegraph 24 November 2010; “Veteran MSP in call for shake -up of 
Parliament” Herald 23 May 2011; Bruce Crawford, “All parties need to help change Holyrood” Scotland on 
Sunday 12 June 2011.  
33 Standards, Procedures and Public Appointments Committee 2nd Report, 2011, Reform of Parliamentary 
business inquiry Phase 1 Report: remodelling the Parliamentary week  (SPP 57) para 6.  
34 Letter from the Presiding Officer to all members, 8 July 2011.  
35 Terence Daintith, “The Kilbrandon Report: Some Comments”, in Harry Calvert (ed), Devolution 
(Professional Books 1975) 31. 
guarantee of effective redress. Despite its novelty, constitutional review of legislation has not 
so far proved controversial. There have been only two cases in which the courts have struck 
down a provision of an Act of the Scottish Parliament, in both cases on grounds of 
incompatibility with Convention rights, rather than reserved matters grounds, and neither 
provoked an outcry.36 Where controversy did arise, it was between the Scottish Government 
and the UK Supreme Court, led by its Scottish members, rather than between the Scottish 
Government and the Scottish courts, over the implications of the ECHR for the Scottish 
criminal justice system, leading to the restriction of the Supreme Court’s recently acquired 
jurisdiction in Scottish criminal cases by the Scotland Act 2012.37  
The referendum debate 
Scotland’s written constitution 
In a speech to the Foreign Press Association in London on 16 January 2013, a date apparently 
chosen because it was the anniversary of the approval of the Articles of Union by the Scottish 
Parliament in 1707,38 the First Minister announced that one of the “first, most fundamental 
and exciting tasks” of the first independent Scottish parliament elected in May 2016 would be 
“to establish the process for Scotland’s first written constitution through a constitutional 
convention.” The description of the constitution as a “written” constitution was at first glance 
curious, given that a constitution prepared by a constitutional convention would by its very 
nature be a written constitution – a work of “conscious art” rather than the result of “natural 
growth”.39 The contrast, however, was with the UK's - and hence Scotland's - 'unwritten' 
constitution, which represented, in the First Minister’s view, a “democratic deficit” an 
                                                          
36 Cameron v Cottam [2012] HCJAC 31; Salvesen v Riddell [2013] UKSC 22. 
37 The story is recounted in Alan Page, Constitutional Law of Scotland (W Green 2015) paras 9-15- 9-23. 
38 Union with England Act 1707 (c 7).  
39 Leslie Wolf-Philips, Comparative Constitutions (Macmillan 1972) 32.  
independent Scotland should not repeat.40 The SNP government was “just one voice in the 
process”, but among the measures that might be included in a written constitution were 
constitutional rights to education and vital social services, a constitutional ban on the 
possession of nuclear weapons, and parliamentary and constitutional safeguards in respect of 
the use of Scotland’s armed forces.  
The Scottish government’s views on what Scotland’s written constitution should include 
were set out more fully in the independence White Paper, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to 
an Independent Scotland, which was published in November 2013. Among the provisions the 
Scottish government would propose for consideration by the constitutional convention were: 
equality of opportunity and entitlement to live free of discrimination and prejudice; 
entitlements to public services and to a standard of living that, as a minimum, secured dignity 
and self-respect and provided the opportunity for people to realise their full potential both as 
individuals and as members of wider society; protection of the environment and the 
sustainable use of Scotland’s natural resources to embed Scotland’s commitment to 
sustainable development and tacking climate change; a ban on nuclear weapons being based 
in Scotland; controls on the use of military force and a role for the Scottish Parliament in 
approving and monitoring its use; the existence and status of local government; rights in 
relation to healthcare, welfare and pensions; children’s rights; and rights concerning other 
social and economic matters, such as the right to education and a youth guarantee on 
employment, education or training. 41   
The constitutional platform 
                                                          
40 Elvidge (n 4) 269 questioned the desirability of a written constitution, pointing out that, like the statutory 
framework for devolution, it would place the domestic courts in a more significant position within the overall 
governance structures than would otherwise be the case. 
41 Scotland’s Future (n 5) p 353; see also Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: from the Referendum to 
Independence and a Written Constitution (February 2013) para 1.10.  
In his January speech to the Foreign Press Association, the First Minister announced that the 
“constitutional platform” for independence – “preserving continuity in key areas, but 
providing the first independent Scottish Parliament with the tools to make Scotland a better 
place” - would be established before the next Scottish Parliament elections in May 2016. Like 
the referendum itself, the Scottish government’s intention was that the constitutional platform 
– or the leading part of it - should be “made in Scotland”.42 Under it the Scottish Parliament 
would have the power to declare “independent statehood for Scotland in the name of the 
sovereign people of Scotland”; bring Scotland fully into the European mainstream on the 
protection of human rights by giving the ECHR the same legal force for reserved matters as it 
already had for devolved matters; provide for the continuity of the monarchy in Scotland; 
provide for a transparent and democratic system for ratification of treaties; provide for 
continuity of laws; define entitlement to Scottish citizenship; provide for the Supreme Court 
of Scotland; and place on the Scottish Parliament a duty to establish a constitutional 
convention to prepare the written constitution.43 The constitutional platform - or that part of it 
that would have been made in Scotland - was published for consultation three months before 
the referendum in the form of a draft Scottish Independence Bill.44 Together with a 
“refreshed” Scotland Act, the Bill once enacted would have constituted the founding 
legislation of an independent Scotland.  
The Scottish Independence Bill  
The Scottish Independence Bill, published in June 2014, was framed in terms of “higher-level 
principles and values” with the technical detail being relegated to the refreshed Scotland Act, 
a summary of which was provided in the consultation document on the draft Scottish 
Independence Bill. The Bill had been drafted to be “accessible, straightforward and concise”, 
                                                          
42 Scotland’s Future: from the Referendum to Independence  (n 41) paras 2.12-2.13. 
43 Scotland’s Future (n 5) pp 338-340. 
44 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5).  
in the hope that this would enable the people of Scotland to see clearly the “most important 
principles, rights and structures of government” on which the SNP government believed an 
independent democratic Scotland should be founded.45 Foremost among those principles was 
the ‘sovereignty of the people of Scotland’ – “In Scotland, the people are sovereign”46 - 
which would replace the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament as “the predominant 
constitutional principle in an independent Scotland.”47   
Under the “interim constitution”, set out in Part 2 of the Bill, the constitutional arrangements 
of the new state would remain essentially unchanged. “Scotland already ha[d] many of the 
institutions that a modern independent state required: a parliament elected by the people, a 
government accountable to the parliament, an impartial civil service, an independent 
judiciary and an autonomous legal system. These institutions [would] continue on 
independence, underpinned by new constitutional arrangements reflecting Scotland’s new 
constitutional status”.48 The Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government would thus 
“continue and assume full powers and responsibility as the Parliament and Government of an 
independent State, while the High Court of Justiciary and the Court of Session in their 
appellate capacities would together become Scotland’s Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of 
the UK Supreme Court in Scotland would cease.49  
The revised Scotland Act 
As for the technical detail, the Scotland Act would be “refreshed and re-written” so that it 
could function effectively in the context of an independent Scotland.50 Several provisions 
would be repealed as no longer relevant to an independent state, including section 28(7), 
                                                          
45 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) Foreword.  
46 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) s 2. 
47 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) p 27. 
48 Scotland’s Future (n 5) p 354.  
49 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) p 34. 
50 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) p 50. 
which provides that the Scottish Parliament’s power to make laws for Scotland “does not 
affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland”, and 
Schedule 5 which sets out the reserved matters on which the Scottish Parliament cannot 
legislate. Others would be amended in the light of independence with references to the Prime 
Minister and the UK Supreme Court, for example, being removed. Many provisions, however 
would be retained, including the electoral system for the Scottish Parliament. The current 
franchise would also continue except that, as in the referendum, it would be extended to 
include 16 and 17 year olds.51 
Limits 
The sovereignty of the people of Scotland was an obvious starting point for the interim 
constitution, given its historical resonance, real or imagined,52and the contrast frequently 
drawn between it and the unlimited sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament, which Lord 
Cooper had famously described in MacCormick v Lord Advocate53as a “distinctively English 
principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law.” A Scottish Parliament, 
however, needs limiting as much as any other.54 Under the interim constitution the Scottish 
Parliament (and Scottish Government) would have continued to be bound by EU law and the 
ECHR.55 The Scottish Parliament, however, would not have been bound by the interim 
constitution: the SNP government rejected the “rigidity” of hard entrenchment or a special 
amending formula as not appropriate for what were intended to be temporary arrangements.56 
Although, according to the independence White Paper, the founding legislation of an 
independent Scotland would not be subject to “significant alteration” pending the preparation 
                                                          
51 A change now made by the Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Act 2015.  
52 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) p 27; for a sceptical view of the “ancient Scottish constitutional 
tradition”, see Page (n 37) para 1-02 and references cited therein. 
53 MacCormick v Lord Advocate 1953 SC 396, 411.  
54 Bernard Crick and David Millar, To Make the Parliament of Scotland a Model for Democracy  (John 
Wheatley Centre 1995) p 7.  
55 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) ss 24, 26.  
56 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) p 63. 
of a permanent constitution by the constitutional convention,57 it would thus have been open 
to a future Scottish Government to amend the interim constitution by ordinary process of 
legislation until such time as it was replaced by the written constitution - at which point it 
would depend on what the written constitution provided. The courts meanwhile would have 
had the power to declare future legislation invalid if it was incompatible with EU law or the 
ECHR, but not if it was contrary to the Scottish Independence Act or renewed Scotland Act.58  
The interim constitution also included, in line with the SNP government’s views on what the 
written constitution should provide, a series of broad brush obligations and entitlements – in 
respect of nuclear disarmament, equality, children’s wellbeing, the needs of island 
communities, the environment, and the use of Scotland’s natural resources.59 It would have 
been left to the courts to decide to what extent these were judicially enforceable, whether 
alone or in combination with other requirements. In some cases, e.g. nuclear disarmament, 
the view almost certainly would have been that the obligation to pursue negotiations with a 
view to securing nuclear disarmament, and the safe and expeditious removal from the 
territory of Scotland of nuclear weapons based there, was one for which ministers were 
answerable to the Parliament rather than the courts. It was only where legislation was 
incompatible with EU law or the ECHR that the courts would have had the power to declare 
it invalid.60 
Restructuring the Scottish state 
In terms of the organisation of government, a future SNP government would retain the 
unified structure of central government adopted in 2007, which, it was said, had been 
“successful in delivering joined-up thinking and co-operation and provide[d] a firm basis for 
                                                          
57 Scotland’s Future (n 5) p 341. 
58 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) p 63. 
59 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) ss 23 and 28-32.  
60 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) p 63. 
taking on the full range of policy and functions of an independent national government.”61 A 
number of new bodies would be required, including a welfare agency, an expanded tax 
collection agency, a debt management agency, a security and intelligence agency, a Scottish 
defence headquarters, a Scottish Civil Service Commission, a Scottish Passport Agency, and 
a Scottish Border and Migration Service, amongst others.62 The majority of transferred 
functions, however, would be absorbed by existing bodies or else continued on a shared 
basis, “where it makes sense to do so, and where it is in the interests of both Scotland and the 
rest of the UK”,63 prompting the UK government to point out that the UK did not share public 
services, tax administration, pensions systems, or its currency arrangements with any other 
states, and that there were no states in existence that provided their neighbours with shared 
access to their public institutions on the scale the SNP government was promising on behalf 
of the continuing UK.64 The UK government, however, scored something of an own goal 
with its claim that the costs of setting up new institutions could be as high as £2.7 billion  65  - 
a figure arrived at by taking the estimated cost of setting up a UK central government 
department and multiplying it by the number of new bodies required regardless of the scale of 
their responsibilities. But if £2.7 billion was too high, the SNP government’s estimate of 
£200 million was almost certainly too low.  
Local government 
Under the interim constitution there would also “continue to be local government in 
Scotland”.66 Local government would thus achieve the constitutional status it had been 
denied under the devolution settlement, although its powers and responsibilities would 
                                                          
61 Scotland’s Future (n 5) p 362. 
62 Scotland’s Future (n 5) p 362-364. 
63 Scotland’s Future (n 5) p 364. 
64 United Kingdom, united future: Conclusions of the Scotland analysis programme  (Cm 8869 2014) para 1.15.  
65 Cm 8854 (n 2) para 2.4 Box 2.B.  
66 The Scottish Independence Bill (n 5) s 17. 
continue to be a matter for the Scottish Parliament. A future SNP government would also 
argue for the status and rights of elected local governments to be recognised in the written 
constitution.67 This would enable Scotland to fully implement the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government, which provides that the principle of local self-government shall be 
recognised in domestic legislation, and, where practicable, in the constitution. In the absence 
of a written constitution, the SNP government argued that it would be impossible to provide 
this degree of constitutional recognition to local government, but there is nothing in the 
Scotland Act to prevent the entrenchment of local government in the constitutional 
arrangements of the devolved Scotland should that be thought desirable.  
Accountability  
In terms of the accountability of government, the interim constitution would make it explicit 
that the Scottish Government was accountable to the Scottish Parliament, and the Scottish 
Parliament to the people of Scotland.68 The principle was said to be implicit within existing 
arrangements - when it fact it had been explicit from the outset69 - but the SNP government 
believed that one of the advantages of moving to a written constitution was that such “basic 
and fundamental democratic principles can, and should be, expressly stated.”70 
Accountability, it acknowledged, had been identified by the Consultative Steering Group as 
one of the key principles on which the operational needs and working methods of the Scottish 
Parliament should be based, and it was appropriate this should be reflected in the 
constitution.71  
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Commented [TM3]: I am not sure I follow this. Are you 
suggesting that under the Scotland Act the SP could achieve 
legal entrenchment, i.e. disable itself from repealing 
legislation on local government. 
 
Commented [AP4R3]: What is there to prevent it from 
laying down a special procedure, e.g. a two-thirds majority 
on the model of the Scotland Bill cl 10, for the reform of the 
system of local government?   
There was no mention of the criticisms of the Parliament’s performance in holding 
government to account, which on the contrary “had set an example within the UK on how a 
modern legislature should operate. In line with its founding principles of power sharing, 
accountability, access and participation, and equal opportunity, the Parliament had 
successfully put into practice the principles on which it was founded”.72 The debate itself, 
however, did little to allay fears of a ‘one party state’, with protests by the minority in the run 
up to the referendum that the SNP government was using its majority to close down inquiries 
and to edit out criticisms of government policy.73   
Under the interim constitution, as we have seen, the courts would retain the power to strike 
down Acts of the Scottish Parliament which were inconsistent with EU law or incompatible 
with the ECHR.74 There would be no Scottish equivalent of the declaration of incompatibility 
procedure under the Human Rights Act for Scottish Parliament legislation in the former 
reserved areas, which the SNP government argued would “bring Scotland fully into the 
European mainstream on the protection of human rights by giving the [ECHR] the same legal 
force on reserved matters as it already has for devolved matters”.75 European mainstream or 
not, it would have been open to the Scottish Parliament to set aside a judicial decision that 
was not to its liking in the absence of any form of entrenchment of the interim constitution. 
The Scottish Parliament would thus have escaped, even if only temporarily, the confines of 
the devolution settlement, leaving a majority Scottish government in effectively the same 
position as a majority UK government under the UK’s unwritten constitution - a curious 
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outcome, even if only a temporary one, for a process that took as its starting point the 
“outdated and profoundly undemocratic Westminster system”.76  
After the referendum 
The Smith Commission  
There was only one question on the ballot paper for the independence referendum on 18 
September: “Should Scotland be an independent country?” As part of the negotiations over 
the referendum, the SNP government had sought a second question on further powers for the 
Scottish Parliament, but the UK government was adamant that only once the question of 
Scotland’s future within the United Kingdom had been settled could there be any 
consideration of further devolution. With a UK general election set to take place in May 
2015, the assumption was that work on further powers in the event of a No vote would only 
begin after the UK general election, by which time the countdown to the Scottish Parliament 
elections in May 2016 would already have begun. In the final days of the referendum 
campaign, however, with the polls suddenly narrowing, the leaders of the three main political 
parties at Westminster “vowed” to deliver “extensive new powers” for the Parliament “by the 
process and according to the timetable announced by our three parties, starting on 19 
September”,77 a vow widely regarded, rightly or wrongly, as having sealed victory for the No 
campaign.  
On the morning of 19 September, once the results of the referendum had become clear, the 
Prime Minister announced that Lord Smith of Kelvin had agreed to oversee a set of cross-
party talks with the purpose of agreeing a package of new powers to be devolved to the 
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Scottish Parliament. By its terms of reference, which were published on 23 September, the 
Commission was required to:  
“convene cross-party talks and facilitate an inclusive engagement process across 
Scotland to produce, by 30 November 2014, Heads of Agreement with 
recommendations for further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament. This 
process will be informed by a Command Paper to be published by 31 October and will 
result in the publication of draft clauses by 25 January. The recommendations will 
deliver more financial, welfare and taxation powers, strengthening the Scottish 
Parliament within the United Kingdom.” 
The “Smith Commission Agreement”, which was published on 27 November,78 followed by 
draft clauses on 22 January 2015,79 forms the basis of the Scotland Bill currently before the 
Westminster Parliament.  
The Scotland Bill 
In terms of the governance of Scotland, the Bill’s significance is threefold. First, the Scottish 
Parliament and Scottish Government are both “recognised as a permanent part of the United 
Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements,”80 according them the same “in all time coming” 
status as was accorded the Court of Session by the Acts of Union three centuries before.81 
Constitutional theorists will doubtless continue to argue that Westminster retains the power to 
abolish the Scottish Parliament, but the political reality, which the Bill reflects, is that the 
Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government are part of the United Kingdom’s constitutional 
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arrangements, and will continue to be so for so long as Scotland remains part of the United 
Kingdom. 
Second, it is also recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom “will not normally 
legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament”.82  
This provision gives statutory backing to the ‘Sewel convention’, which as set out in the 
Memorandum of Understanding that governs relations between the UK government and 
devolved administrations, provides that “the UK Government will proceed in accordance 
with the convention that the UK Parliament would not normally legislate with regard to 
devolved matters except with the consent of the devolved legislature.”83 As applied in 
practice, the convention extends to Westminster legislation altering the Scottish Parliament’s 
legislative competence and the executive competence of the Scottish Ministers, as well as 
with regard to devolved matters. Were such changes to be made by order under the Scotland 
Act the consent of the Scottish Parliament would be required. Their inclusion within the 
scope of the convention thus ensures the need for the Parliament’s consent regardless of 
whether they are made by primary or secondary legislation. At the time of writing it remains 
to be seen whether the clause will amended so that it reflects the application of the 
convention in practice.  
The repeal of section 28(7) of the Scotland Act, which affirms the continuing powers of the 
United Kingdom Parliament to make laws for Scotland, was not canvassed during the Smith 
Commission process, but the combined effect of these two provisions once enacted will be to 
set the seal on a federal or near federal relationship between Scotland and the rest of the 
United Kingdom, in which the ‘devolution’ settlement cannot be amended or legislation 
enacted with regard to devolved matters without the Scottish Parliament’s consent.  
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Third, although the focus of the Smith Commission process was on financial, welfare and 
taxation powers, the Scottish Parliament will also gain powers over “all matters relating to 
the arrangements and operations of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government, 
including powers over the overall number of MSPs or the number of constituency and list 
MSPs, and powers over the disqualification of MSPs from membership and the 
circumstances in which a sitting MSP can be removed”. 84  Scotland will thus gain a 
substantial measure of control over its institutional arrangements as prescribed by the 
Scotland Act. Acknowledging the risk that a future Scottish Government might seek to revise 
those arrangements to suit its own ends, Scottish Parliament legislation amending the 
franchise, the electoral system or the number of constituency and regional members for the 
Scottish Parliament will require to be passed by a two-thirds or ‘super’ majority of the 
Scottish Parliament.85   
These powers have attracted little in the way of discussion so far, but most interest is likely to 
centre on the possibility of their use to increase the number of MSPs, not least given the 
challenges the Parliament will face in terms of the scrutiny of government as a result of the 
further increase in its powers, following on from those conferred by the Scotland Act 2012. It 
must be open to question, however, whether an increase in the Parliament’s size is in the 
realm of practical politics. It is perhaps noteworthy in this respect that, in the consultation on 
the draft Scottish Independence Bill, the SNP government said that that it did not propose 
increasing the number of MSPs, which it considered “appropriate for a country of Scotland’s 
size”.86  
The other major candidate for reform is the Parliament’s electoral system, which the 
Arbuthnott Commission on Boundary Differences and Voting Systems recommended should 
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be reviewed after the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections, a recommendation endorsed by the 
Calman Commission.87 In the consultation on the draft Scottish Independence Bill, the SNP 
government also said that it did not propose altering the Parliament’s electoral system. 
The Human Rights Act 
An early test of the federal character of the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the 
United Kingdom may arise as a result of the Conservative government’s manifesto 
commitment to replace the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights (which may have 
been included in its manifesto as a bargaining counter in negotiations with possible coalition 
partners rather than as a cast iron commitment which might have to be implemented).  
Although it might be argued that the Act’s replacement relates to reserved matters, and hence 
does not require the Scottish Parliament’s legislative consent, it is difficult to imagine such a 
reform being taken forward without the Scottish Parliament’s consent - as a matter of 
practical politics if not of constitutional convention.88 As things stand, there seems little 
question either that the Scottish Parliament’s consent would not be forthcoming, leaving the 
Conservative government, if it decides to go ahead, with an uncomfortable choice between 
legislating in breach of the convention, by then enshrined in statute, or else not repealing the 
Human Rights Act so far as Scotland is concerned.89  If the Scotland Act 2012 is a reliable 
guide, the Conservative government will prefer to proceed by agreement rather than publicly 
test the limits to the Sewel convention. 
Local government 
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The Scotland Bill has no bearing on the position of local government, which remains a matter 
for the Scottish Parliament. Local government, however, made full use of the opportunity 
presented by the referendum debate to press the case for greater powers. In his foreword to 
the Smith Commission agreement, Lord Smith recorded “a strong desire to see the principle 
of devolution extended further with the transfer of powers from devolution to local 
communities.” Acknowledging that this was an issue that would require “significant further 
thought and discussion”, he welcomed “the enthusiasm of all parties for greater 
empowerment of our communities. The Scottish Government should work with the 
Parliament, civic Scotland and local authorities to set out ways in which local areas can 
benefit from the powers of the Scottish Parliament.”90  Whether this recommendation will be 
acted upon, and if so in what form, remains to be seen. Shortly before the referendum, the 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities’ Commission on Strengthening Local Democracy 
called for a fundamental review of the structure, boundaries, functions and democratic 
arrangements for all local governance in Scotland.91 Since the referendum the Scottish 
Government has appointed a Commission on Local Tax Reform to consider alternatives to 
the council tax system – the second review of local government finance since devolution – 
and published a consultation paper on greater autonomy for Scotland’s island areas by way of 
follow-up to the “prospectus” for island communities published during the referendum 
campaign.92 
Accountability  
The further increase in its powers as a result of the Smith Commission process and the 
Scotland Bill represents a major challenge for the Scottish Parliament in terms of the scrutiny 
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of government. Lord Smith, who saw the Parliament’s increased powers as “demanding” 
improvements in parliamentary scrutiny, recommended that the Parliament’s Presiding 
Officer continue to build on her work on parliamentary reform by undertaking an “inclusive 
review” that would produce recommendations to run along alongside the transfer of 
additional powers.93 In October 2014 the Presiding Officer asked the Standards, Procedures 
and Public Appointments Committee to consider whether committee conveners should be 
elected by the whole Parliament on the model of the House of Commons. In its Session 3 
legacy paper, the Conveners Group had noted the growth of “assertive” parliamentary 
committees over the last thirty years at Westminster, and recommended that the Standards, 
Procedures and Public Appointments Committee consider introducing a system of election of 
committee members and conveners.94 The Standards, Procedures and Public Appointments 
Committee noted that elected chairs seemed to have enhanced the status and authority of 
committees in the House of Commons, but was not persuaded that the election of conveners 
was the right starting point for reform of the Parliament’s committee system. “Instead there 
should be a focused and practical discussion about the steps needed to strengthen 
committees’ ability to scrutinise legislation and policy and hold the government to 
account.”95 The Committee agreed therefore to undertake an inquiry into the operation of 
committees with a view to enabling the Parliament to decide what changes are needed before 
the end of the current session in March 2016.  
Conclusion 
The Scottish Parliament was not just about the “the sovereign right of the Scottish people to 
determine the form of government best suited to their needs.” It was also about the subjection 
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of the government of Scotland to democratic scrutiny and control, a theme which runs 
through Scotland’s constitutional history from the criticisms levelled at that “Pooh Bah, the 
Secretary of State for Scotland” in the 1920s, to the Claim of Right adopted at the inaugural 
meeting of the Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1989. Reflecting on the referendum 
debate, however, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it was more about powers than 
accountability and control – the tools the Scottish Parliament needed to make Scotland a 
better place than the governance of Scotland.  The Yes campaign’s answer to the governance 
question amounted to little more than its repeated insistence upon the need to “eliminate the 
democratic deficit”, be it in the form of governments Scotland did not vote for or the UK’s 
unwritten constitution. 96 It was an issue the No campaign chose not to address, mindful no 
doubt of the risk of being seen to ‘talk down’ Scotland. The more extensive the Parliament's 
powers, however, the more demanding of a fuller answer the question of governance will 
become.  Whether the inquiry currently being conducted by the Standards, Procedures and 
Public Appointments Committee will provide the beginnings of that answer remains to be 
seen.97  
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